I was shocked when I read the Dec. 12 front-page article “Air Force punishes 15 over leaks on Discord.” It should have been titled “Air Force colonel creates permissive security environment that made leak possible and likely.”
I am a retired senior Defense Department analyst. Before I retired, I led the Chelsea Manning damage assessment and participated in the Edward Snowden review.
We recommended a strict need-to-know requirement for information with constant supervision and monitoring to prevent this from happening again. The Air Force and Col. Enrique Dovalo turned our recommendations upside down.
The Air Force instead totally relied on the security clearance process, which is the weakest link in the security chain. It granted a top-secret, sensitive compartmented information (TS-SCI) clearance to someone who expressed anti-government views and believes in conspiracy theories. Col. Dovalo had this outlandish idea that because everyone had TS-SCI clearance, they should “know your why,” and he provided all airmen with highly classified briefings. This destroyed the security principle of strict need-to-know. He granted Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) access to a support technician responsible for heating and air-conditioning, Airman 1st Class Jack D. Teixeira. No support tech should ever have a reason to be on JWICS. It is for intelligence production, not personal interest.
The Air Force apparently never supervised or monitored Airman Teixeira’s activity on JWICS. If you have a JWICS account, it should come with key-tracking software so your supervisor can check every search and webpage you view.
Denis Michael “Mike” Katchmeric, Gainesville
Read More: Opinion | The Air Force relied on the weakest link in the security apparatus